Paradoxical consequences of Balzer's and G�hde's criteria of theoreticity. Results of an application to ten scientific theories

Abstract

It is shown that the criteria of T-theoreticity proposed by Balzer and Gahde lead to strongly counterintuitive and in this sense ‘paradoxical’ results: most of the obviously empirical or at least nontheoretical terms come out as theoretical. This is demonstrated for a lot of theories in different areas. On the way, some improved and some new structuralist theory-reconstructions are given. The conclusion is drawn that the T-theoreticity of a term cannot possibly be ‘proved’ on the basis of the mathematical structure of theory T alone (as Gahde and Balzer suggest). Rather, an independent notion of pre-T-theoreticity and-more importantly-of empiricity is needed; i.e., “not empirical” and “not pre-T-theoretical” are independent, necessary but not sufficient conditions for “T-theoretical” (this is also a necessary complement of Sneed's original criterion). Finally it is asked whether the structuralist criterion of T-theoreticity complemented by such independent conditions would be a satisfactory answer to ‘Putnam's challenge’, and the answer again is negative: the criterion is not able to distinguish between empirically contentful and completely contentless (superfluous) ‘theoretical’ terms.