Abstract
In this paper, the authors try to clarify the relations between Meinong’s and Russell's thoughts on the ontological ideas of existence. The Meinongian theory on non-existent objects does not in itself violate the principle of non-contradiction, since the problem that this hypothesis offers to the theory of definite descriptions is not so much a logical problem as an ontological problem. To demonstrate this we will establish what we believe are the two main theses basic to the theory of descriptions: the epistemological thesis and logical thesis.
Highlights
The Theory of Non‐Existent ObjectsThe first exposition of Russell’s theory of descriptions appeared in his On Denoting paper published in the journal Mind in 1905
Given what "x" designates, if both statements are analytically true, it only means that there is, in the sense of subsisting, the round square that is not round. If both statements are true, it is understood that their truth corresponds to no real existence, but to a subsistence, the subsistence in question is just that of the impossible object: the round square that is not round
If existence means what could happen as a particular value of the formal argument that constitutes the description, the descriptive phrase, like the proposition that contains it, can make sense, even if nothing "real" is referred to by the description
Summary
The first exposition of Russell’s theory of descriptions appeared in his On Denoting paper published in the journal Mind in 1905. The theory of non-existent objects violates the principle of non-contradiction using the following argument: "Round square which is not round" designates an unreal object If this proposition is symbolized with the letter "x", the statements "x is round" and "x is not round" are both analytical, and true, which clearly violates the principle of non-contradiction. If both statements are true, it is understood that their truth corresponds to no real existence, but to a subsistence, the subsistence in question is just that of the impossible object: the round square that is not round In this sense, the analytical truth of both statements is limited to affirming the existence of a contradictory entity: there is (subsists) a round square that is not round, but this is neither actual nor possible, but impossible. The same sentences can appear grammatically as subjects of meaningful sentences, and yet, once these sentences are analyzed with all precision, it turns out that they no longer have such subjects
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