Paradox and Protreptic in Plato’s Meno

Abstract

The Meno contains a host of puzzles and problems, not the least of which is the status of the theory of recollection in the dialogue. This essay aims to present both the theory of recollection and what has been called “ Meno’s Paradox ” not as epistemological issues, but as issues of eristic and protreptic. I suggest that the true purpose of the Meno ’ s use of the theory of recollection is to be found in the implicit and explicit caveats that Socrates uses to frame the theory. These caveats, which indicate that we should not take the theory of recollection as demonstrated or proven, ultimately justify interpreting Socrates’ claims about the theory of recollection serving a protreptic rôle as definitive. This paper has three sections. Section I offers some preliminary remarks on the nature of philosophical protreptic as a literary genre of the fourth century in general and its employment in Plato. Section II distinguishes the geometry problem used to 'demonstrate' the theory of recollection is employed to solve from the problem of inquiry into virtue that Socrates and Meno are facing. I show that the two problem are disanalagous. I also discuss the character of Meno as susciptible to a certain kind of persuasion, and how Socrates converts Meno's questions about the possibility of philosophical enquiry into a sophistical paradox and offers the theory of recollection as a solution to it. Finally, Section III offers evidence that Plato provides us with a number of caveats and warnings about taking the theory of recollection in the Meno as serious epistemology, leading to the conclusion that Plato's primary purpose in employing it in the Meno is as a protreptic device meant to keep Meno on the path of philosophical inquiry.