Abstract
The aim of my article is to present "the liar's paradox" from a non empirical perspective of the language. The paradox may be as though "resolved" (but in just another way then it is done within the semantics view by Tarski), among other things, thanks to Lacan's psychoanalysis. Namely "the liar's paradox" which is connected with a division between a statement and an enunciation is treated by Lacan as accompanying a subject during his (her) process of gaining a certainty about himself (herself) and about the world and as impossible to overcome in a traditional way. The problem of "liar's paradox" may be merely suppressed. An attempt of suppressing of a nonsense took place, according to Lacan and Foucault, within the area of "Meditations" by Descartes and maybe more in their modern interpretations. The non empirical proposition of an elimination "the liar's paradox" consists in an acceptance of the madness (as defined by Foucault) and at the same time in staying in a surface of some texts. This strategy does not allow to divide talking in two: the language and the meta-language. Moreover I try to discuss with Żiżek concept concerning with an incomprehension this problem (mainly the usage of the meta-language) by Derrida.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
