Paradigm Lost: Thomas Kuhn and educational research

Abstract

In recent years the notion of 'paradigm' has been introduced into the language of educational research and curriculum evaluation. The genesis of its adoption by educationists can be established fairly accurately. In 1972 Parlett & Hamilton wrote the mimeographed version of their seminal paper (henceforth Parlett & Hamilton, 1977) which contrasted the 'agricultural-botany' and 'illuminative paradigms' of educational evaluation. In the same year Esland (1972) made a distinction between the 'psychometric' and 'phenomenological' paradigms in an Open University course unit, Pedagogy and the Teacher's Presentation of Self[I]. As is so often the case in education, the term 'paradigm' was taken up from another field of academic endeavour and the authors mentioned above cite specifically their source as The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 1970), a central text in the philosophy of science (see Parlett & Hamilton, 1977, p. 7; Esland, 1972, p. 18). It is surprising how rapidly the notion of 'paradigm' originally developed by Kuhn in a quite different context has become part of the technical vocabulary of educational researchers, especially curriculum evaluators. It is now a well-worn phrase used in professional conversation, conference discussions and published accounts [2]. In this paper I argue that the introduction of the term 'paradigm' into educational research is based upon a misunderstanding or inaccurate representation of Kuhn's work and that it can lead to muddled and unclear thinking among educationists, especially those involved with curriculum evaluation. Its invocation may lead to unproductive debate and misrepresent the educational research enterprise. It has become a shorthand word that we use too easily; it must be either used more precisely or purged. I begin by describing how Kuhn used his notion of paradigm in its original context and how the central qualities of his definition have been lost in its transfer to education. I then ask whether it is in fact feasible to apply an analysis seeking to explain the work of the community of natural scientists to the very different circumstances of the community of educational researchers. I then examine the dangers attached to the too easy acceptance of Kuhn's ideas by educational researchers.