Abstract
This paper deals in a Stackelberg differential game with Kuhn (1962) ideas of paradigm depletion and resiliency. Paradigm is considered as potential knowledge, as a stock of ideas that can be harvested to produce science. The results are: (i) paradigm depletion can be optimal, (ii) the optimal editor's shadow price of potential knowledge must be non-positive, if it is positive, the editor is a keeper of the orthodoxy rather than a scientist, (iii) editor's and/or researcher's impatience is bad for science, and (iv) in equilibrium editor's behavior does not matter for research effort, while only editor's behavior matter for the paradigm.
Full Text 
Sign-in/Register to access full text options
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Published version (
Free)
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
