Pappas on the Role of Sensations in Reid's Theory of Perception

Abstract

In a recently published paper,' George Pappas examines two questions, one, did Thomas Reid defend some form of direct realism regarding sensory perception, and, two, what role or roles do sensations play in Reid's account of perception? Pappas develops two main conclusions. One is that, despite some textual evidence to the contrary, Reid is best interpreted as holding both perceptual direct realism and epistemic direct realism. Crucial to showing Reid held the former is establishing that for him even though sensations accompany or are even required for perception, they are not intermediaries the perception of which is required for the perception of external physical objects. Crucial to showing Reid held epistemic direct realism is establishing that for him knowledge of sensations is not required for knowledge of material objects.' The other main conclusion is that a perception for Reid is best construed as a state or event involving first, one or more sensations, second, an irresistible non-inferential belief (an INB) in some presently existing object or state of affairs, and third, the fact that the sensation or sensations cause the belief. This, the preferred version of what Pappas calls a single-tier analysis, is superior to a double-tier interpretation, according to which Reid essentially restricted perception to an INB. To make this case Pappas argues for two theses. One is the philosophical thesis that the preferred single tier analysis is superior to the double tier analysis because unlike the latter, it (i) recognizes that perception has sensuous as well as conceptual or intentional content and (z) is fully compatible with perceptual direct realism.3 The