Abstract

The shortcomings of the voting systems used in the 2000 presidential election raised the awareness of the need to replace these systems. As a result, with the funds of Help America Vote Act (HAVA), many US states switched to Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems before the 2004 elections. Unfortunately these paperless voting machines were not as secure and efficient as state officials had hoped. Since their implementation, many studies have shown the threats of these systems and their flaws. While some data security experts tried to improve these voting systems, many discouraged their use and recommended more transparent methods.Although, several countries in Europe and around the world have successfully utilized E-voting, many US districts and states still don’t trust this technology and are returning to paper ballots. In this paper, we will propose a new system as a solution to the current problems. This approach combines the advantages of both paper ballots and Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems while avoiding the major flaws of these systems.

Highlights

  • The dispute over the Minnesota Senate race in 2008 shows that tallying votes correctly can still be challenging even when using straightforward paper ballots. 2,920,214 voters voted using paper ballots; unlike in the presidential race where Democrat Barack Obama defeated Republican John

  • The recounting process, which lasted for about three weeks, resulted with Republican incumbent Norm Coleman leading Democrat Al Franken by 188 votes (Tibbetts & Mullis, 2008)

  • E-voting machines have failed to record thousands of votes. These machines caused many troubles during the 2008 general elections, especially in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where officials had to issue and use emergency ballots on Election Day (Borenstein, 2008). When it comes to the recounting process, many activists and data security experts would rather spend weeks recounting than using a Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machine that will give the same results for every recount

Read more

Summary

Minnesota Paper Ballots

The dispute over the Minnesota Senate race in 2008 shows that tallying votes correctly can still be challenging even when using straightforward paper ballots. 2,920,214 voters voted using paper ballots; unlike in the presidential race where Democrat Barack Obama defeated Republican John. The Republican Senator Norm Coleman, who had held his seat since 2002, won over Democrat Al Franklin by 215 votes in the initial count (Tibbetts & Mullis, 2008) This close margin triggered an automatic recount. The use of E-voting could have minimized or even eliminated the challenged ballots; as a result, the recounting process would have been accomplished faster This promised efficiency requires that the E-voting machines function properly. These machines caused many troubles during the 2008 general elections, especially in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where officials had to issue and use emergency ballots on Election Day (Borenstein, 2008) When it comes to the recounting process, many activists and data security experts would rather spend weeks recounting than using a DRE machine that will give the same results for every recount. We will discuss and explain the limitations of such an auditing approach

Verified Voting Methods
DRE and VVPRS Requirements
Our Proposed System
Mechanical Part
Election Day
Tallying and Auditing
Meeting the Requirements
Straight Ticket Option
Future Work
Findings
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call