Abstract
In the article, the author focuses on Giorgio Agamben's theory of the state of emergency and analyses the interpretation of necessity as a justification of the state of emergency in philosophy of law. The author concludes that the introduction, implementation and monitoring of special legal regimes is not an exclusive policy or legal issue, therefore, it is not possible to limit decision-making to political or legal arguments. Thus, the judiciary, when assessing the correctness of the actions of state authority during an emergency situation, may also have to assess and use political arguments. Necessity as a justification for special legal regimes is in itself a formal concept, which in each emergency situation must be filled with a certain content – a legal value that must be protected.
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