Abstract
ABSTRACT In authoritarian Russia, during the COVID-19 crisis the federal center unilaterally shifted the costs of unpopular anti-pandemic measures onto the regions. By applying the principal–agent theory to the Russian case, we show that, faced with the delegated task of combating the pandemic, agents (regional governors) shirked: using informational asymmetry, they started manipulating information about their activity to the principal (federal center). As a result, both sides got stuck in a “manipulation trap”—a situation, in which a rapid policy change, even if needed, does not occur, as it is neither justifiable for the principal nor required by him.
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