Palestinian islamism and Israeli-Palestinian peace

Abstract

In 1993 and 1994 it was assumed that Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation would drive Israeli-Palestinian peace. However, in the period from 1994 to 1999, the peace process basically did not move forward. The first goal of this paper is to explain why the Israeli-Palestinian peace process stalled in this time period. The second goal of this paper is to suggest policies that could increase the likelihood of arriving at, and maintaining, a stable Israeli-Palestinian peace in the future. I argue that the failure of the peace process from 1994 to 1999 is related to the political rivalry between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Islamic movement Hamas, Hamas' lack of participation in the peace process, and the nature of Israeli-Palestinian economic relations. The interaction of these issues creates a highly unstable situation, resulting in periodical spells of Israeli-Palestinian violent conflict. I conclude a stable peace requires an independent Palestinian state with a capital in parts of East Jerusalem, a unified territory without Israeli extra-territorial enclaves, a fair share of natural resources, control over public policies, and an economy not integrated with that of Israel. The issue of Palestinian refugees must be resolved, but the return of refugees to Israel is not practical; a viable alternative is a financial settlement. In the short run, Israel should strengthen the Palestinian Authority by granting it tangible political gains. Hamas should be formally invited to participate in the peace process.