Abstract

There is a widely perceived problem with the workweek in America. Juliet Schor [1991, 68-72] brought attention to this problem, noting that it is not confined to academia or corporate management, but is pervasive also at consulting firms, publishing houses, etc. 1 A Veblenian perspective on this situation seems appropriate because status anxieties may be influencing the self-reporting of work effort. As in Veblen's time, the ideal way to enhance status is by displaying unnecessary consumption, e.g., announcing that one is sailing one's ketch to Newfoundland (not to catch fish for eating, but to sketch people who do). For many people today, that kind of display can no longer be afforded, but salaried workers can still keep up appearances by concealing necessary work, e.g., understating the hours it takes to get a grant or make a sale. Ancient myths of prowess reward those who give the appearance of affluence while doing little required drudgery. By discouraging individuals (particularly males) from being seen to work long hours, such myths of prowess function as de facto labor unions among wage workers. Much as a petroleum cartel is weakened when members produce more oil than they admit, so a defacto labor union is weakened when workers have the opportunity, under a salary (or commission) form of compensation, to conceal their extra work from their social rivals. A switch from wages to non-hourly compensation shifts the labor supply curve to the right, leading to longer hours and lower effective hourly compensation.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call