Ownership Variation in Violated Regulations and National Care Standards: Evidence From Social Care Providers

Abstract

Social care services are increasingly provisioned in quasi-markets in which for-profit, public, and third sector providers compete for contracts. Existing research has investigated the implications of this development by analyzing ownership variation in latent outcomes such as quality, but little is known about whether ownership predicts variation in more concrete outcomes, such as violation types. To address this research gap, we coded publicly available inspection reports of social care providers regulated by the Care Inspectorate in Scotland and created a novel data set enabling analysis of ownership variation in violations of (a) regulations, and (b) national care standards over an entire inspection year ( n = 4,178). Using negative binomial and logistic regression models, we find that for-profit providers are more likely to violate non-enforceable outcomes (national care standards) relative to other ownership types. We did not identify a statistically significant difference between for-profit and third sector providers with regard to enforceable outcomes (regulations).