Ownership structure of oil revenues: Political institutions and financial markets in oil-producing countries

Abstract

This study examines the impact of the ownership structure of oil revenues on financial markets and institutions, and the intermediating role of political institutions. Using the fixed-effects model and GMM for robustness, we analyse data from 82 oil-producing countries. We find several key results. Firstly, government ownership of oil revenues undermines the efficiency of financial institutions when the quality of political institutions is weak, but enhances their efficiency when political institutions are strong. Secondly, the impact of private ownership of oil revenues is negative on the depth of and access to financial institutions when the quality of political institutions is weak, but positive when political institutions are strong. We observe similar threshold effects for the depth of and access to financial markets in the subsample of developing countries. We conclude that oil-producing countries need solid political institutions to benefit from oil wealth and to boost financial development.