Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and IPO Post-Listing Liquidity

Abstract

This paper investigates how ownership concentration and structure and corporate governance relate to the post-listing liquidity of IPO firms, where the latter is measured by various dimensions of trading activity, breadth, and depth. Using a sample of 1,049 Chinese IPOs issued on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges over the 2001-2010 period, we find firms with a broader shareholder base and higher ownership concentration have greater post-listing liquidity. So do firms with a higher state ownership and lower institution ownership. Corporate governance is also important in explaining the cross-sectional differences in post-listing liquidity; specifically, post-listing liquidity is higher for firms with CEO duality, a larger and more independent board, and more frequent board meetings. The 2005 Split Share Structure Reform, which increased the proportion of tradable shares, has a positive impact on liquidity.