Overview of: “Assessing the Earned Discharge Pilot Project: The Importance of Context, Capacity, and Content”

Abstract

Research Summary Largely as a result of punitive measures passed in the 1980s and 1990s, prison and parole populations have soared across the United States. California's policies are reflective of these tendencies, and as a result, the state has experienced especially acute crises in parole and prison operations. The Earned Discharge pilot program was introduced in 2007 in an effort to improve parolees’ outcomes by incentivizing early release for low-risk offenders performing well on parole, and reallocating resources from these parolees to higher-risk parolees. To accomplish this goal, the pilot used a risk-assessment instrument to screen for nonviolent, low-risk offenders, and a case review process to further identify ideal candidates. However, the pilot program faced several obstacles and was downgraded to a simulation exercise. The implementation analysis found that the most salient of these obstacles were: • a challenging political “context,” which created barriers to adopting an Earned Discharge program in concordance with evidence-based standards. • parole administration's limited “capacity” to provide strong leadership, and problems achieving agency-level coordination. • lack of stakeholder buy-in related to the “content” of the Earned Discharge Program and the translation of initial program concepts into practice. Policy Implications Analysis of the Earned Discharge program implementation highlighted a number of barriers to nonpunitive criminal justice innovations. These barriers must be overcome in order to implement programs whose principles are supported by scientific research. The results of the Earned Discharge program simulation suggest that, due to program design changes based on political exigencies, few benefits would be achieved by the program even if it had been fully implemented. Such interventions must overcome the political difficulties involved in reducing punitive control of some low-level, but politically unpopular groups, such as gang members and sex offenders. Buy-in from prosecutors and other local politicians and crime control agents, who have little incentive to support such programs, must be achieved. Parole agency coordination and leadership should also be strengthened in order to instill confidence in the agency's ability to provide program integrity.