Abstract
AbstractI respond to three sets of questions and objections to the account of empirical reason I offer in my book Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry. (i) In response to doubts expressed by Christopher Hill, I outline the case against Simple Representationalism, the view that experience confers an epistemic status on certain perceptual judgments and that it does so in virtue of its content. (ii) In response to objections of Lisa Titus (née Miracchi) and Hill, I show that the account is not too liberal in its attributions of rationality to transitions, beliefs, and views. (iii) In response to questions raised by David Sosa, I explain why qualities do not constitute appearances and why the account offered of hallucinations is not overly restrictive.
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