Overseeing Oversight: The Logic of Appointments to Brazilian State Audit Courts

Abstract

Horizontal accountability institutions are designed by the state to oversee itself. When are these institutions more or less likely to work as an effective check on government malfeasance? Focusing on appointed councilors who head subnational audit courts, we develop some preliminary hypotheses about when such auditors are likely to be most independent of executive branch influence. Then, using a new dataset on the current and historical composition of Brazil’s state audit courts (TCEs), we document some new facts about the identities of the audit court councilors and test hypotheses about the conditions under which different types of councilors are likely to be selected. Our preliminary results suggest that higher quality councilors are selected during election years and by the executive branch. They also suggest that further work should focus on the role of the legislature in the politicization of TCEs — both in selecting councilors and determining the length of their service. This raises some interesting questions about whether institutional reforms aimed to curb executive political interference merely displace political interference to the legislative branch.