Overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee and bank risk-taking: Evidence from China

Abstract

Although overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee is prevalent in banks' boards, the existing literature focuses on the impact of a single board committee on bank risk-taking. Using a sample of Chinese listed banks from 2007 to 2020, we examine whether and how overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee influences bank risk-taking. The results show that overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee reduces bank risk-taking. Furthermore, the risk-averse role of overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee is stronger in banks with weaker monitoring intensity and higher information acquisition costs. When exploring the potential channels of monitoring and information, we find that overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee helps reduce executive earnings management and make conservative interbank liability decisions. Finally, compared with other overlapping member characteristics, the role of overlapping risk management committee chair and financial experts in reducing bank risk-taking is more evident.