Overcoming the phenomenological Perpetuum mobile in clinical cognitive neuroscience for the benefit of replicability in research and the societal view on mental disorders.

Abstract

Cognitive neuroscience comes in many facets, and a particularly large branch of research is conducted in individuals with mental health problems. This article outlines why it is important that cognitive neuroscientists re-shape their role in mental health research and re-define directions of research for the next decades. At present, cognitive neuroscience research in mental health is too firmly rooted in categorial diagnostic definitions of mental health conditions. It is discussed why this hampers a mechanistic understanding of brain functions underlying mental health problems and why this is a problem for replicability in research. A possible solution to these problems is presented. This solution affects the strategy of research questions to be asked, how current trends to increase replicability in research can or cannot be applied in the mental health field and how data are analyzed. Of note, these aspects are not only relevant for the scientific process, but affect the societal view on mental disorders and the position of affected individuals as members of society, as well as the debate on the inclusion of so-called WEIRD and non-WEIRD people in studies. Accordingly, societal and science political aspects of re-defining the role of cognitive neuroscientists in mental health research are elaborated that will be important to shape cognitive neuroscience in mental health for the next decades.