Abstract

This article theoretically discusses Arlie Hochschild's (1983, 1998) concept of the ‘real’ and ‘false’ self (1983: 194) and how this holds together her model about how it is we manage our emotions. Hochschild draws on ideas about surface acting, deep acting and authenticity to support her theory of emotion management. In this discussion I argue that these ideas undermine the clarity of the theoretical model Hochschild tries to develop to explain emotion management. The first aim here is to demonstrate that this concept of the real and false self acts as an unnecessary conceptual linchpin making Hochschild's ideas about emotion management opaque. The second aim in this article is to theoretically engage with Pierre Bourdieu's (1984, 1990) concept of habitus as a way of overcoming Hochschild's idea of the real and false self.

Highlights

  • This article discusses Arlie Hochschild's model of emotion management (1983: 35) and identifies inherent problems with her use of the ‘real’ and ‘false’ self as a conceptual linchpin (Hochschild, 1983: 194e195)

  • Bolton sees Hochschild's concept of emotional labour as having too narrow a focus on capitalism and puts forth her own typology of emotion management: ‘pecuniary’ with ‘prescriptive’, which relate to instrumental performances of emotion in the workplace rooted in economic and status gain and are empty of feeling; as well as ‘presentational’ emotion management, which refers to the ‘basic socialized self’ (Bolton and Boyd, 2003: 297), and ‘philanthropic’, which is an intentional and freely chosen act of giving emotion to customers and co-workers that are not prescribed by workplace feeling rules

  • What is missing from both Hochschild's (1983) and Bolton's (2005) theoretical framework is a way of explaining how the individual interacts with structured feeling rules that does not rely on a true or real self

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Summary

Introduction

This article discusses Arlie Hochschild's model of emotion management (1983: 35) and identifies inherent problems with her use of the ‘real’ and ‘false’ self as a conceptual linchpin (Hochschild, 1983: 194e195). Hochschild (1983) wanted to explain how it is that we can act differently in certain social settings by managing our emotions. She suggests that by managing our emotions we are able to work on the self and present to the world a persona that is expected, and fits in. In the second part of this article I engage with Pierre Bourdieu's (1984, 1990) concept of habitus as a way of overcoming Hochschild's idea of the real and false self

The inner self: real and authentic?
Confusing concepts
The ‘real’ and ‘false’ self: a misleading conceptual linchpin
Exploitation of the ‘real’ self: autonomy and agency
The problem with the ‘real’ self
Bourdieu and habitus
Conclusions
Full Text
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