Abstract

This article investigates how outward foreign direct investment by U.S. multinational corporations influences industry lobbying for trade protection in the United States, focusing on interindustry structure of goods sales networks between upstream and downstream sectors and also on the multinationals’ input procurement patterns. If foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals switch input sources from U.S. to host-country suppliers, U.S. suppliers should receive a negative demand shock, ceteris paribus. An empirical test finds that those U.S. upstream sectors that are highly dependent upon U.S. multinationals for goods sales tend to lobby more as the multinationals’ overseas production and sales increase.

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