Abstract
In the case that an incumbent is a dogmatic ideologue whose ideology is not in line with that of protesters, outside lobbying activities (Social Movement Organizations) cannot have a substantial impact on policy regardless of the positive effect of any important characteristic of these activities. Three causal mechanisms are suggested to explain this phenomenon. Firstly, the more distant the position of a policy-maker than the position of a lobbyists is, the less will she be willing to yield to lobbyists’ demands. Secondly, these politicians do not give up on preferred ideological stance that is crucial to them even in the case of a threat to their re-election prospects. Or, thirdly, they may value being re-elected as much as mainstream politicians but they depend on the votes from their core supporters rather than the median voter. Therefore, shifting policy ends up with punishment in the next elections. This argument is explored by selecting a ‘most likely’ crucial case and applying process tracing method.
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