Abstract

What limits on what can be done to individuals in pursuit of some “greater good” are morally permissible, and under what sorts of circumstances? This depends largely on one’s approach to interpersonal aggregation — that is, summing different goods (or harms) affecting different persons and weighing them against other similarly attained aggregates. I outline four approaches: non-aggregationism (e.g. John Taurek, 1977); asymmetric aggregationism (e.g. Peter Singer in many specialist writings, Alistair Norcross); symmetric aggregationism (e.g. Singer in popular writings); and weak aggregationism (e.g. T.M Scanlon). I conclude by briefly suggesting that the weak approach is the “least worst” one.

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