Outcome-Based Pricing for New Pharmaceuticals via Rebates

Abstract

The price of new brand-name prescription drugs has been rising fast in the United States. For example, the Amgen cholesterol drug Repatha had an initial list price of $14,523 per year. Patients, even with insurance coverage, must pay out of pocket a significant portion of this price. The treatment might not be successful, and this possibility reduces risk-sensitive patients’ incentives to purchase the drug. The high price together with the chance of negative treatment outcomes may lead payers to deny coverage for the drug. Outcome-based pricing has been proposed as a way to reallocate the risks and improve both payer resource allocation and patient access to drugs. According to an outcome-based rebate contract between Amgen and Harvard Pilgrim Healthcare, if a patient on Repatha suffers a heart attack or a stroke, both patient and insurer are refunded the cost of the drug. We use a stylized model to analyze the effect of outcome-based pricing via rebates. Our model captures the interaction between heterogenous, price-sensitive, risk-sensitive patients who decide whether to purchase the drug; a payer deciding whether to provide coverage for the drug; and a price-setting pharmaceutical firm seeking to maximize expected profits. We find that, in many cases, a pharmaceutical firm and payer cannot simultaneously benefit from outcome-based pricing, and who will benefit is determined by the probability of treatment success. Outcome-based pricing thus appears unlikely to solve the issues of high drug prices and high payer expenditures. However, supplementing outcome-based pricing with a transfer payment from firm to payer can make payer and firm (but not necessarily the patients) better off than under uniform pricing when the drug has a low chance of success. This paper was accepted by Stefan Scholtes, healthcare management.