Abstract
The universe that surrounds us is vast, and we are so very small. When we reflect on the vastness of the universe, our humdrum cosmic location, and the inevitable future demise of humanity, our lives can seem utterly insignificant. Many philosophers assume that such worries about our significance reflect a banal metaethical confusion. They dismiss the very idea of cosmic significance. This, I argue, is a mistake. Worries about cosmic insignificance do not express metaethical worries about objectivity or nihilism, and we can make good sense of the idea of cosmic significance and its absence. It is also possible to explain why the vastness of the universe can make us feel insignificant. This impression does turn out to be mistaken, but not for the reasons typically assumed. In fact, we might be of immense cosmic significance—though we cannot, at this point, tell whether this is the case.
Highlights
The universe that surrounds us is vast, and we are so very small
It turns out that we might be of immense cosmic significance, even universally central, in the only sense that matters
That the size of the universe, and our tiny dimensions, have no metaethical significance. They lend no support to nihilism, nor do they tell us anything about the existence of objective value
Summary
Bernard Williams is a good example of contemporary responses to worries about cosmic significance. If naturalism ruled out objective value, it would rule out objective value even if the naturalist universe was the size of a matchbox, or came into existence five minutes ago. If objective value exists, whether in some Platonic realm or in some other sense (naturalist or not), it would exist regardless of the size and age of the universe It would exist even if the universe was infinitely vast, infinitely old, and absolutely indifferent and silent. That the size of the universe, and our tiny dimensions, have no metaethical significance They lend no support to nihilism, nor do they tell us anything about the existence of objective value. We can conclude that if our sense of cosmic insignificance has anything to do with the size and age of the universe, it has little to do with the tension that some metaethicists see between naturalism and objective value.. If anything is a muddle, it is to respond with despair to the (supposed) truth of nihilism
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