Abstract
Commonly studied voting rules are thoroughly evaluated on the basis of the probability that their election outcomes can be manipulated with insincere voting, since it is a frequently held belief that Borda Rule is particularly susceptible to manipulation. A careful investigation shows that the validity of this perception does not hold up under scrutiny. A voting rule that has recently received a lot of attention is also analyzed; the Three-valued Scale Evaluative Voting Procedure that can be viewed either as a particular case of Range Voting or as an extension of Approval Voting. The case of more than three candidates is considered to determine if the overall superiority of Borda Rule remains valid, and the significant impact of voter abstention on election outcomes is investigated.
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