Abstract
According to the regulatory changes in Brazilian oil and gas industry, nine leasing sales for exploration areas and two licensing rounds for inactive areas with marginal oil pools were promoted since 1997. The licensing model elected by the regulatory agency to concede petroleum exploration rights for these areas is a competitive firstprice sealed bid auction. This paper uses auction theory concepts to analyze rules, requirements for participation and acquisition, biddable factors such as signature bonus and minimum commitments for hydrocarbon potential production evaluation. This paper presents the results obtained with both exploration and inactive areas leasing systems, regarding competitiveness, information disclosure and analyze some impacts of these results in the Brazilian petroleum scenario. Besides the differences on the auction rules, the eleven licensing rounds promoted by ANP were a successful initiative by creating a competitive environment on the Brazilian exploration and production industry with more than 60 national and international companies and the creation of the new prospects for E&P activity in Brazil.
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