Orthodoxy in Ukrainian Political Life 2004–2009

Abstract

In setting the scene for my consideration of the role of Orthodoxy in the political life of Ukraine from 2004 to 2009 I briefly outline the complex history of Ukraine and the correspondingly complex evolution of its religious structure. I identify the triple intellectual discourse which is still lively in all Ukrainian political and cultural circles today, which consists in choosing one of three answers to the question ‘what is Ukraine?’: part of Austria–Hungary (or, more widely, multiethnic Europe); part of Russia; or a state in its own right, seeking its ‘special path’. I then consider the various ways in which Ukraine may be divided into regions and sub-regions and how these accompany political preferences: in the 2000s Ukrainians have been divided into two camps, along the border between the old Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (for Viktor Yuschenko, an independent state and integration into Europe) and the Muscovite Tsardom plus the Crimean Khanate (for Viktor Yanukovych, the communists and a de facto restoration of the USSR). There is also general difference between the west and the east of the country in the areas of religiosity, frequency of church attendance and parish membership: in the western regions these are at Central European levels (or even somewhat higher), while in the eastern regions they are some four times lower. I then move on to look at the political self-positioning of the various churches. I identify three different tendencies within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) alone. I argue that nominal adherence to an institution means much less in Ukraine than it does in Russia, and an individual's personal qualities much more. I then illustrate my various arguments with a close look at the role of the Orthodox churches in the 2004 presidential election campaigns and in the ‘Orange Revolution’ and its aftermath. I argue that the UOC-MP proved unable to provide Yanukovych with enough support in 2004, while all the other major religious organisations managed to cooperate successfully to back Yuschenko, and that since the fall of Yanukovych's ‘anti-orange’ government in 2007 the UOC-MP has started slowly drifting towards greater autonomy with less regard for Moscow-based church politics, and towards a greater readiness to negotiate with its rival Orthodox churches. My conclusion is that the regional and confessional complexity of Ukraine obliges the authorities to take all political and religious interests into consideration.