Abstract

The National Security Act of 1947 enabled the CIA to “to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council [NSC] may from time to time direct.” Although intended to establish the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s control over the collection of clandestine foreign intelligence, this language was vague enough to authorize other covert operations (psychological, political, and paramilitary) at the direction of the NSC. Attempts at covert action oversight gained traction only after the exposure of unacknowledged CIA activities. The term “covert action” was not defined in legislation until the 1990s. This article categorizes congressional attempts to establish the parameters and regulate covert action both in terms of prohibiting or enabling such action and of enacting substantive or procedural rules. The success of such attempts has depended heavily on the extent of bipartisan support in Congress. Congress is more likely to choose substantive laws when faced with recent intelligence scandals, and Congress is less likely to create prohibitive laws as bipartisan support increases. These trends are supported by the legislative history of the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act and the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.

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