Originalism , Pragmatic Conservatism, and Living Document Judicial Philosophies: Explaining Variation in U.S. Supreme Court Votes in Criminal Procedure Cases for the 1994–2014 Terms of Court

Abstract

Prior research on U.S. Supreme Court justice votes and case outcomes has examined a variety of hypotheses to explain variation in voting and case decisions in criminal procedure matters. Largely ignored by prior work, however, is the notion that the effects of the measures used to examine these prior hypotheses may vary for the justices based on the judicial philosophy espoused and followed by the justice. This article identifies three distinct overarching judicial philosophies of law interpretation that have guided the justices for much of the Rehnquist Court and the entirety of the Roberts Court: Originalism, Pragmatic Conservatism, and Living Document. It contextualizes the Information, Affected Groups, and Legal Issue hypotheses in a framework that considers their potential effects across Originalist, Pragmatic Conservative, and Living Document justices on the Court for the 1994 through 2014 terms. The study finds that enhanced activity by special interest organizations (the Affected Groups Hypothesis) in support of the non-government other party impacts vote direction among Pragmatic Conservative and Living Document justices but not for the Originalist justices. It also finds more case type (Legal Issue) effects for Originalist justices than for Pragmatic Conservative and Living Document justices in that for Originalist justices a vote for the government is less likely in cases that concern statutory meaning (relative to constitutional meaning). Implications are discussed.