Origen y desembocadura de la acción: el sujeto inevitable

Abstract

This paper formally deals with the unfolding of an answer to the question: to whom is an action to be ascribed? or, stated more precisely, it pretends to be an analysis of the principle that the action pertains to whom it is attributed to. In order to avoid falling into subjectivistic or individualistic positions, which might totally ascribe the meaning of an action solely to the agent, the matter is studied from the intersubjective control of the action —taking special account of the proposals advanced by Hart, Feinberg and Gardiner. Hence, the question of the “irresponsible action” (i.e. that one claimed by no one), through a consideration of the categories of ascription and responsibility, facilitates a restatement of the problem as to whether there exist different qualities of action and, in the affirmative, where the differences must he drawn. In this connection, special reference is made to Kotarbinski, Ryle, Danto, and Davidson, among others. A tentative conclusion, more than discarding the intention, reveals the necessity of restoring it in a more collective, public and all pervasive perspective; in other words, it discloses the convenience of taking into account the various modes of existence of the agent.