Organs, Money, & Dignity: Immanuel Kant on the Incentive Question in Living Organ Donation

Abstract

This paper deals with some of the ethical issues concerning living organ donor transplantation, particularly with commodification of human bodily parts, in the context of Immanuel Kant’s ethical system. It primarily aims to refute the common perception about Kant’s categorical opposition to compensated organ donation. This paper argues that that compensation for organ donation can be accommodated in Kantian Ethics, as financial rewards should be construed as nonmoral incentives, a mere possible ground of choice or as a mere candidate reason for action. The promise of compensation does not necessary what impels the individual to dutiful action such as organ donation – and for as long as what motivates the donor in donating his organ is a motive of duty (i.e. his duty of beneficent helping), consideration or acceptance of financial rewards do not necessarily compromise its moral worth or nobility.