Abstract

As part of federal organizational sentencing guidelines enacted on 1 November 1991, the United States Sentencing Commission included organizational probation. This sanction allows courts to place convicted corporations on probation, with conditions designed to reduce the likelihood of future law violations and remedy the effects of the original offense. This article explores the history, development, and significance of organizational probation. Its statutory foundations, rejection of market logic, linkage to organizational theory, and approach to regulatory relations are identified as its theoretical strengths. The forces shaping this unexpected legal outcome, particularly legitimacy concerns on the part of the Sentencing Commission and a business strategy of opposing the Sentencing Commission itself, rather than its specific proposals, are also outlined. The conclusion addresses the prospects for enforcement of organizational probation.

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