Organizational ethical integrity: good and bad illusions

Abstract

Integrity has always been an ambiguous or vague concept. Integrity as a general concept seems to be too problematic in philosophical or scientific language. This paper will aim to improve and preserve the specific notion of integrity—the concept of moral integrity as a virtue and as a moral purpose, and its opposite—the concept of counterfeit moral integrity or false moral integrity. It stresses a strong relationship between the concepts of morality and the concept of moral integrity: if moralities are diverse, moral integrity has many forms too, and the forms are only as good as the morality behind them. The paper emphasizes their organizational dimensions because any organizational impact—due to its scale—can be especially beneficial or detrimental to society. The first objective is to introduce a preliminary conceptual order by means of definitions and typologies to support clearer (language analysis) and more critical (Critical Theory) thinking on organizational moral integrity: establishing definitions of moral and ethical integrity, new definitions of material and formal moral integrity, descriptions of irrational and rational moral integrit, and individual and organizational moral integrity. The definitions and typologies are designed to be prototypes of false integrity “detectors”. The second objective is to outline an ideal of a total and rational moral commitment for every organization: organizational material ethical integrity (OMEI). The ideal of OMEI points out that most self-proclaimed ethical organizations are probably not ethically committed. The third objective is to justify the theses that (1) moral integrity can be good or bad, not simply good, and that (2) false moral integrity can be good. Whether we think of “Kantian-Nazi” integrity of Adolf Eichmann or lethal and irrational integrity of Islamic State fighters, moral integrity based on bad morality is bad. False ethical integrity (or rational moral integrity) is always bad because it imitates good morality for a bad purpose, for example: rational discourse on integrity can be a “smokescreen” to hide exploitation of labor or environmental degradation. As in the case with Irena Sendler who pretended to be “a good slave” to save children’s lives, false moral integrity can be ethically good if it simulates bad morality for a good purpose. The paper offers ethical justifications for “ethical prestidigitators”, “warriors of illusions”, masters of “moral aikido”: persons and organizations that use counterfeit integrity to maximize ethical values.