Abstract
Kevin Wildes recently argued in this journal that the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary treatments requires judgments about quality of life. The A. of this response suggests that Wildes is correct in his general claim about the nature of these judgments, but that he fails to note the important moral issues that arise when others must make treatment decisions for incapacitated patients. Then quality-of-life judgments are inappropriate ; they must be avoided in order to respect that patient's actual condition
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