Order in chaos: re-understand social instability in China

Abstract

Instability in China manifests as non-political demands, mass actions and conflicts between cadres and citizens. It can be attributed to the deficiencies of political institutionalization and the special role and function of the government in the process of market transition. Since 1978, the governance objective of the party-state has been catch-up growth while maintaining stability. This has created dual institutional roles for the State as both modern government and capital source. As compared to other transitional countries, three paradoxes were created by the restructuring of Chinese state governance to meet the government’s objective: an open, free market with government price controls; an empowered local government that must still accept tasks assigned and controlled by the central government; and, a lessening of societal suppression but social organizations are still limited. This quasi-decentralized governance structure produces several mechanical externalities. It has also lead to the dissipation of the collective welfare system, a deficient social safety net and the governmental absorption of market profits. This further instrumentalizes government functions and capitalizes public power, causing injustices among the distribution of rights, wealth and risk. Ultimately, this manifests as social instability.