Abstract
This paper illustrates the usefulness of game theory for strategic management through theoretical and empirical analysis of price competition in the presence of production backlogs. Game-theoretic analysis predicts a different relationship between relative prices and backlog levels than does analysis that ignores the sorts of interactive considerations emphasized by game theory. Empirical analysis based on data for the U.S. market for large turbine generators between 1951 and 1963 corroborates the game-theoretic prediction. The paper concludes with a discussion of the sorts of situations in which game-theoretic reasoning is particularly likely to prove useful. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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