Ordained and Absolute Power in Scotus' Ordinatio I 44

Abstract

The distinction between potentia ordinata and potentia absoluta was a much discussed theme in later medieval theology and philosophy. The content and usefulness of these concepts were disputed. It is clear, however, that the distinction was introduced in the first place to be able us to indicate that God, through his potentia absoluta , could have acted otherwise than He factually wills to do and factually does.1 The distinction is also a much discussed topic among medievalists of our century. Many hold the opinion that the distinction between absolute and ordained power led to theological deviations, especially during the fourteenth century, in which the reliability of God's character and the reliability of created reality would no longer be guaranteed, for it would imply that God could deviate from the order he created before. The heart of this critique is as follows. The original function of the distinction between potentia ordinata and potentia absoluta was to explain that God could have created, by his potentia absoluta , another physical and moral order than He factually did. Given the order of this created reality his potentia absoluta only is a hypothetical realm of possibilities, which were not realised and never will be. Otherwise God would deviate from his earlier intentions and from the order to which He decided before, which would implicate unreliability and arbitrariness of God and of the order which He created. Later on in medieval theology, however, one took over what is called