Orbital Impulsive Pursuit–Evasion Game Formulation and Stackelberg Equilibrium Solutions

Abstract

The spacecraft pursuit–evasion game in orbit with impulsive maneuvers is investigated based on dynamic game theory. First, the game models are developed progressively from the single-impulse game to the multi-impulse game. In the models, the two-sided optimal strategies of both players form a Stackelberg equilibrium in single-impulse games and constitute a multistage Stackelberg equilibrium in multi-impulse games. Then, the optimality necessary conditions for the two equilibriums are derived and simplified as two multipoint boundary value problems (MPBVPs). To handle the complicated MPBVPs, a rolling backward induction based on the Lambert algorithm accompanied by a homotopy shooting method is proposed to solve the equilibrium solutions. Simulations showed the effectiveness of the proposed methods and verified that the obtained solutions are the (multistage) Stackelberg equilibrium. Meanwhile, the differences between the Stackelberg equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium are illustrated in detail. Finally, an analysis of the influence of the observation delay on the game results is provided.