Options for Reconciling China and Japan

Abstract

The Workshop on China-Japan Reconciliation at the Australian National University in August 2006 concluded that to prevent a dangerous drift in Japan-China relations, it was crucial to identify policies and programs that would move their relations in a positive direction. The conferees worked in three groups, each exploring possible actions that might be undertaken at Track I (official), II (semi-official and nongovernmental), or III (public) levels. What follows in this report are my own views of the alternatives, though they owe much to the discussions that took place in Australia.1 Multilevel Activity An essential element of conflict resolution in a case as difficult as the China-Japan rivalry is that action needs to take place at multiple levels. Ultimately, of course, the two governments must make agreements and otherwise accept new courses of action. But at a time of competitive nationalisms and mutual dislike in public opinion, Chinese and Japanese leaders may be severely constrained in what they can do. Nongovernmental organizations-peace groups, business associations, newspapers, labor unions, environmental organizations-and prominent individuals, as well as government officials acting in their private capacities, may be in a better position than state leaders to launch initiatives. That is why Tracks II and III warrant attention. Moreover, we must also consider, within Track I, the positive role that multilateral groups can play, as well as third parties (especially the United States) that have a large stake in and influence over China-Japan relations. Hence, the action chart below encompasses unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral levels of action under Track I-steps that China or Japan could take on its own, steps that both might take simultaneously or reciprocally, and steps that the two countries might take within the context of new or existing groups. The chart, to be clear, is merely suggestive; its essential purpose is to move our thinking to tension reduction and conflict management, and away from worstcase hypothesizing. An Action Menu Following is an elaboration of some of the proposals that are in the chart. I have selected those that strike me as being particularly important, not because their chances of being implemented any time soon are high, but because each step may generate the kind of goodwill and trust that will lead to other positive steps- such as those that address the most difficult issues of all, historical grievances. * Regularization of High-Level Diplomacy (Track I, Bilateral) Now that direct dialogue has resumed, Chinese and Japanese leaders should pledge to make it a regular occurrence, not just for the top leaders but also for cabinet officials and parliamentarians. A counterpart of such diplomacy might be the creation of a prevention- focused bilateral group to provide advance notification (for instance) of troop or ship movements. * Mutual Appreciation (Track I/Unilateral and Track II) Chinese government, media, and other institutions (including schools) can contribute to a positive atmosphere by expressing appreciation for Japan's generous contributions to China's economic rise. Although expressions of appreciation have been made from time to time, they are often diluted by bitter reminders of the past and suggestions that Japanese business has also benefited from the aid. The Japanese side therefore has an obligation too: to acknowledge the benefits it has received, and to consider new ways to contribute to China's development that also benefit Japan, such as an extension of environmental protection programs when official development assistance (ODA) ends in 2008. * Affirmations of Good Intentions (Track I, Bilateral) Although words can never replace deeds, professions of friendly intentions and mutual respect, apologies for past conduct, and a positive common vision of future relations do serve good purposes. …