Options and Choices in the Disposition of Excess Weapon Plutonium

Abstract

AbstractMore than 50 tons of weapon-related plutonium (WPu) is expected to become excess andavailable for disposition by the year 2003 in Russia and a similar amount in the United States.Per two reports from the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the NationalAcademy of Sciences (1994 1 and 1995 2), the hazard of theft and incorporation into nuclearweapons impels us to guard this Pu carefully and as soon as possible to transform it into a formless accessible for use in nuclear weapons. To this end, CISAC adopted the “Spent FuelStandard” for the disposed WPu, which, if met, renders the WPu no greater hazard per kg thanthe much larger amount of reactor Pu in the form of spent fuel, since CISAC finds that separatedRPu can be used for nuclear weapons with little additional difficulty beyond that posed byseparated WPu. Many disposition routes can be eliminated on the basis of cost or other metric.The two principal survivors (of about equal cost and difficulty for the United States) are thepartial burning of WPu as MOX and the direct vitrification of WPu (as oxide) with high-level‘defense wastes’. Both these approaches should be pursued urgently, with experiments toqualify the processes, until one is selected on the basis of hard evidence. Either approach wouldcost about $1 B, within a factor two, to dispose of 50 tons of excess WPu. The CISAC analysiswill be presented, with comments on utility of RPu in weapons, on the DOE PlutoniumDisposition Study, and on ‘explosive criticality’ in the repository.