Abstract
This paper considers optimum fleet capacity for fish stocks that vary randomly and are managed by separate states. Assigning a particular fleet to a particular stock will be less profitable than allowing fleets to move between stocks. Transfer of excess catch quotas between states improves profitability, but produces a global optimum only if payments are attached to the transfer. A free transfer of excess quotas results in overcapacity and dissipation of rents. A Nash bargaining solution with respect to transfer prices, but without side payments, gives solutions very close to the global optimum.
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