Abstract
In 2009, public health agencies across the globe worked to mitigate the impact of the swine-origin influenza A (pH1N1) virus. These efforts included intensified surveillance, social distancing, hygiene measures, and the targeted use of antiviral medications to prevent infection (prophylaxis). In addition, aggressive antiviral treatment was recommended for certain patient subgroups to reduce the severity and duration of symptoms. To assist States and other localities meet these needs, the U.S. Government distributed a quarter of the antiviral medications in the Strategic National Stockpile within weeks of the pandemic's start. However, there are no quantitative models guiding the geo-temporal distribution of the remainder of the Stockpile in relation to pandemic spread or severity. We present a tactical optimization model for distributing this stockpile for treatment of infected cases during the early stages of a pandemic like 2009 pH1N1, prior to the wide availability of a strain-specific vaccine. Our optimization method efficiently searches large sets of intervention strategies applied to a stochastic network model of pandemic influenza transmission within and among U.S. cities. The resulting optimized strategies depend on the transmissability of the virus and postulated rates of antiviral uptake and wastage (through misallocation or loss). Our results suggest that an aggressive community-based antiviral treatment strategy involving early, widespread, pro-rata distribution of antivirals to States can contribute to slowing the transmission of mildly transmissible strains, like pH1N1. For more highly transmissible strains, outcomes of antiviral use are more heavily impacted by choice of distribution intervals, quantities per shipment, and timing of shipments in relation to pandemic spread. This study supports previous modeling results suggesting that appropriate antiviral treatment may be an effective mitigation strategy during the early stages of future influenza pandemics, increasing the need for systematic efforts to optimize distribution strategies and provide tactical guidance for public health policy-makers.
Highlights
In March/April 2009, a new swine-origin strain of influenza A/ H1N1 virus was detected in human populations in California and Mexico
By May 6, the U.S Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had distributed 11 million of the 50 million antiviral treatment courses held in the federal portion of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS); since the recipients had local stockpiles as well, this allowed the CDC to exceed the predetermined target of distribution of 31 million treatment courses of oseltamivir and zanamivir prior to the acceleration phase of the pandemic [1]
N (e)/N (e)z1: Pandemic influenza transmission model Our model includes the 100 largest metropolitan areas in the United States, which we identified by aggregating Census Bureau Statistical Areas (CBSA) that share a common airport [13,14]
Summary
In March/April 2009, a new swine-origin strain of influenza A/ H1N1 virus (pH1N1) was detected in human populations in California and Mexico. Accompanying the distribution was guidance recommending the use of antivirals primarily for treatment of suspected or confirmed cases of severe respiratory infection caused by this new strain [2]. Recent extrapolations from reported cases estimate that the pandemic caused over 50 million infections in the U.S population; the majority of these have been asymptomatic or clinically mild, but pH1N1 led to a substantial burden of hospitalization and death [3,4]. Key policy statements have called for the use of mathematical models to support the development of an evidence-based policy for effectively deploying the remaining antiviral stockpile and other limited or costly measures to limit morbidity and mortality from pH1N1 [5,6]. The typical approach has been to evaluate a relatively small set of candidate strategies [7,8,9,10]
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