Optimizing power system investments and resilience against attacks

Abstract

This paper studies the combination of capacity expansion and switch installation in electric systems that ensures optimum performance under nominal operations and attacks. The planner–attacker–defender model is adopted to develop decisions that minimize investment and operating costs, and functionality loss after attacks. The model bridges long-term system planning for transmission expansion and short-term switching operations in reaction to attacks. The mixed-integer optimization is solved by decomposition via two-layer cutting plane algorithm. Numerical results on an IEEE system shows that small investments in transmission line switching enhance resilience by responding to disruptions via system reconfiguration. Sensitivity analyses show that transmission planning under the assumption of small-scale attacks provides the most robust strategy, i.e. the minimum-regret planning, if many constraints and limited investment budget affect the planning. On the other hand, the assumption of large-scale attacks provides the most robust strategy if the planning process involves large flexibility and budget.