Abstract
In the pilot provinces of China’s electricity spot market, power generation companies usually adopt the separate bidding mode, which leads to a low willingness of demand-side response and poor flexibility in the interaction mechanism between supply and demand. Based on the analysis of the demand response mechanism of the power day-ahead market with the participation of power sales companies, this paper abstracted the game process of the “power grid-sales company-users” tripartite competition in the electricity market environment into a two-layer (purchase layer/sales layer) game model and proposed a master–slave game equilibrium optimization strategy for the day-ahead power market under the two-layer game. The multi-objective multi-universe optimization algorithm was used to find the Pareto optimal solution of the game model, a comprehensive evaluation was constructed, and the optimal strategy of the demand response was determined considering the peak cutting and valley filling quantity of the power grid, the profit of the electricity retailers, the cost of the consumers, and the comfort degree. Examples are given to simulate the day-ahead electricity market participated in by the electricity retailers, analyze and compare the benefits of each market entity participating in the demand response, and verify the effectiveness of the proposed model.
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