Abstract
Effective counter-terroristic operations require efficient intelligence. Recently, Kress and Szechtmann (2009) analyzed the impact of the level of intelligence to the outcome of a fight between the government and a small insurgent group in a descriptive, asymmetric Lanchester-style model. The present paper uses optimal control theory, particularly Pontryagin's maximum principle, to find the optimal intelligence policy and recruitment rate of the government forces. In particular, we intend to study multiple long-run steady states and complex behavior of the optimal solution paths. Moreover, a differential game between the government and the terrorist is proposed.
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