Abstract
In the e-commerce market, many e-commerce platforms act as resellers when selling products, and act as agents when selling other products. In the sales process, e-commerce platforms can either build their own blockchain anti-counterfeit traceability platforms or cooperate with third-party blockchain anti-counterfeit traceability platforms. This will generate four scenarios: 1) reseller, building its own platform (RE); 2) reseller, cooperating with a third-party platform (RO); 3) agent, building its own platform (ME); 4) agent, cooperating with a third-party platform (MO). Therefore, this paper constructs a differential game model under four modes to explore the interaction between the choice of sales mode and the choice of anti-counterfeit traceability service strategy. The results show that suppliers’ profits are influenced by various aspects. On the one hand, in small-scale markets, the situation in which suppliers can realize higher profits evolves from ME to RO as the wholesale price increases, and in large-scale markets, suppliers are more profitable in the ME mode. On the other hand, with the increase of market scale and the decrease of unit price of anti-counterfeit traceability service of third-party platform, the situation that suppliers can achieve higher profit evolves from RE to RO and then to RE. For e-commerce platform, self-built platform is a better choice. In the small-scale market, as the market size increases, the cost performance of anti-counterfeit traceability service decreases, and the best choice for e-commerce platform evolves from resale to agency sales, and in the large-scale market, the best choice for e-commerce platform is resale.
Highlights
Along with the accelerated pace of consumer upgrading, the e-commerce market is expanding rapidly at an alarming rate [1]–[4]
The influence of market size on the data-driven marketing (DDM) strategy of e-commerce platforms is determined by the unit price of anti-counterfeit traceability services charged by third-party Blockchain anti-counterfeit traceability platform (BATP), and in a reasonable range, (i.e., 0 < τ < ) the market size will have a positive influence on the DDM strategy of e-commerce platforms
The impact of market size, wholesale price, and unit price of anti-counterfeit traceability services charged by third-party BATPs on anti-counterfeit traceability strategy and DDM strategy under different models is determined by different conditions
Summary
Along with the accelerated pace of consumer upgrading, the e-commerce market is expanding rapidly at an alarming rate [1]–[4]. To solve the above problems, this paper considers a distribution channel consisting of an upstream supplier supplying products, a downstream e-commerce platform coordinating sales and anti-counterfeit traceability services, and continuous consumers. We constructed differential game models under four modes of RE/RO/ME/MO, described the product innovation degree and brand goodwill with state equations, and examined how the sales mode choice of e-commerce platforms interacted with the anti-counterfeit traceability service strategy. The innovations of this paper are: (1) from a dynamic perspective, the evolution of product innovation degree and brand goodwill is portrayed under the addition of technology investment by suppliers and blockchain anti-counterfeit traceability service strategy provided by e-commerce platforms. Under the MO model, the impact of market size on the DDM strategy of e-commerce platforms depends on the unit price of anti-counterfeit traceability services charged by third-party BATPs. Second, we compared the retail prices of the products under the four models.
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