Optimists, Pessimists or Skeptics: Explaining Variations in Post-Cold War International and Regional Security

Abstract

With the end of the Cold War, analysts advanced competing expectations about the likely character of the post-Cold War Order. Many expected a far-reaching transformation in the fundamental character of world politics (notably, a decline in the centrality of the state in world politics). Some of these predictions were quite optimistic (esp. Liberals and Constructivists)- believing the changes will lead to more peace and cooperation; some were pessimists-predicting the emergence of new types of conflicts, while others (the realists) remained skeptic regarding the possible transformation (for better or worse) in the fundamental character of international politics, even if taking into account specific changes in the global distribution of capabilities as leading to some important changes in the dynamics of the international system - whether in the direction of a benign hegemon or balance of power politics. While none of these perspectives predicted accurately the nature of the international system, there is a differential application of the predictions of the competing approaches to different regions. Some regions seem to fit the optimistic expectations (Europe, South America), others fit the pessimists’ predictions (South Asia, Africa, Middle East), while still others might accord with realist expectations (East Asia and the post-Soviet). Some other regions went through a transition from fitting the pessimist line to resemble more closely the optimist approach (the Balkans). How could we explain the variations in the level of peace, order, institutionalization and cooperation in the various regions? I’ll argue that the combined effect of two factors-state strength and national congruence - is the most important, although an additional factor can mitigate or aggravate their effects - great power intervention. The two key factors are state strength - the effectiveness of the functioning of state institutions; and national congruence - the extent of congruence between geo-political boundaries and national aspirations and identities in the region. Regions in which the states are strong and nationally coherent will tend to meet the optimists’ predictions. Regions in which at least some of the states are failed states - both weak and incongruent - will follow the pessimist predictions; while regions with strong states but incongruent will tend to produce a revisionist model. Finally, the instability prevalent in regions populated by failed states can sometimes be mitigated by the intervention of a benign hegemon, but in highly fragmented regions such interventions might face a lot of problems and have some de-stabilizing effects.