Optimising Express Packaging Recycling: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Modelling Government Strategies under Extended Producer Responsibility

Abstract

This study presents a tripartite evolutionary game model examining the interplay among government, producers, and recyclers within the express packaging recycling network. Emphasizing the government's role as an endogenous variable under the extended producer responsibility framework, our study elucidates the behavioural evolution and stability of network subjects under distinct government mechanisms. Leveraging MATLAB simulations, we analyse subject behaviours to validate the model, revealing insightful contrasts between static and dynamic subsidy mechanisms. Our findings highlight that in the context of a static subsidy mechanism, equilibrium among the three subjects remains elusive. Recyclers' disposal fees show an inverse correlation with subsidy limits, yet an enhanced recycling rate directly corresponds to subsidies. However, excessive subsidies risk triggering adverse government regulations. Thus, we advocate for refined punitive policies alongside judicious, moderate subsidy systems to optimize recovery rates and social welfare. Conversely, a dynamic subsidy mechanism drives all subjects towards a stable equilibrium point, demonstrating optimal incentive effects. This study underscores the importance of government policy refinement and moderation in subsidy systems for achieving sustainable express packaging recycling, emphasizing the delicate balance between incentivization and regulatory intervention within the recycling network.